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JURISDICTION, MERITS, AND PROCEDURE:
THOUGHTS ON DODSON’S TRICHOTOMY
Howard M. Wasserman *
In his outstanding article, In Search of Removal Jurisdiction, 1 Professor Scott Dodson delineates the appropriate boundaries between rules of
subject matter jurisdiction and rules of judicial procedure in the context of
removal time limits, and argues that we must develop a “broader understanding of the interrelationship and boundaries among the trichotomy of
jurisdiction, procedure, and merits.” 2 He also suggests that the strands of
each pair in the triangle interact in distinct ways and require distinct rules
for separating one from the other. 3 Having sought in recent work to define,
clearly and cleanly, boundaries between subject matter jurisdiction and the
substantive merits of federal claims of right, 4 I agree as to both points.
This Essay constitutes an initial move towards that understanding. It
examines each pair in the conceptual trichotomy, considering the connections at each point in the triangle, when those connections come into play,
and how and why to disentangle each pair.
I. JURISDICTION AND MERITS
The easiest pair to disentangle should be subject matter jurisdiction and
substantive merits of federal claims of right. Although jurisdiction has been
called a word of “many, too many, meanings,” 5 it can broadly be defined as
the court’s raw, baseline power and legitimate authority to hear and resolve
the legal and factual issues in a class of cases. 6 Merits, by contrast, are de*
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fined by who can sue whom, what real-world conduct can provide basis for
a suit, and the legal consequences of a defendant’s failure to conform that
conduct to its legal duties. 7 The consequence of the jurisdictional label
most frequently sounds in practical effects: jurisdictional issues are not subject to waiver by parties; the court bears an independent obligation to investigate and raise jurisdictional problems; and the court resolves any factual
issues on which jurisdiction turns. 8 On the other hand, merits issues should
be resolved at trial, typically with a jury serving as finder of any contested
facts. 9 Most dramatically, courts tend, properly or otherwise, to construe
jurisdictional rules “rigidly, literally, and mercilessly,” 10 in a way they do
not with merits rules.
My basic argument has been that there should be no overlap in the
definitions between jurisdiction and merits because statutory grants of federal jurisdiction focus on non-substantive questions, distinct from the
source of the substantive right sued upon. 11 Jurisdictional rules ordinarily
inquire about either the identity of the parties or the source of the legal right
or liberty asserted; 12 neither inquiry depends on the success of the substantive claim asserted. 13 The Supreme Court recently recognized this in Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., holding that an element of the plaintiff’s federal claim
of right does not affect the court’s jurisdiction; the plaintiff’s success or
failure in pleading and proving an element determines only whether the
plaintiff prevails on the merits. 14 Arbaugh commands, and I have argued,
that courts should consider a provision of positive law as jurisdictional only
when its plain language is addressed to the court and speaks in terms of judicial power about the class of cases that courts can hear and resolve. 15
Neither Congress nor the Court has maintained a sufficiently sharp distinction between jurisdiction and merits, and, unfortunately, Arbaugh did
not resolve the matter with finality. Most problematically, Arbaugh kept
alive the questionable doctrine of Bell v. Hood, under which a court lacks
jurisdiction where a federal claim is insubstantial or wholly frivolous. 16 I
7
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criticize this failure elsewhere, arguing that Bell serves no purpose other
than to create confusion and uncertainty in the jurisdiction/merits corner. 17
Arbaugh also permitted Congress to define jurisdiction in terms of substantive merits—so long as it is clear in doing so. 18 The court’s authority to
resolve legal and factual issues going to a claim of right should not hinge on
the ultimate, or even potential, success of that claim of right. Otherwise,
there is no rational way for Congress and the courts, in writing and interpreting jurisdictional grants, to decide when to overlap and when not to. If
the issues can overlap, then every dismissal or rejection of a claim potentially becomes a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and no claim ever can be
said to be defeated on the merits. 19 Alternatively, if only some jurisdictional grants are bound up with merits, there is no explanation or justification for why some merits issues should be jurisdictional and others not.
Courts thus continue to wrestle with statutory text and congressional
intent at the sign of any apparent jurisdiction/merits overlap. This wrestling
frequently occurs with respect to federal sovereign immunity, where Congress consents to suit for certain claims under certain conditions and grants
federal jurisdiction to hear those suits. 20 But if the conditions for the waiver
of sovereign immunity are not met, does the court lack jurisdiction over the
action? Or does the plaintiff’s claim against the government fail on the
merits because the government is not subject to a judicially remediable substantive legal duty?
This divide formed the core of John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United
States. 21 Under the Tucker Act, the United States can be sued for monetary
claims—sounding in the Constitution, federal law, contract, quasi-contract,
or non-tort liquidated damages—with exclusive jurisdiction vested in the
United States Court of Claims. 22 A separate provision imposes a six-year
statute of limitations for commencing actions in that court. 23 Statutes of
limitations ordinarily are characterized as substantive; they are an affirmative defense to the merits of the claim. 24 But the claim of right against the
United States exists only because Congress waived sovereign immunity;
thus, the argument goes, the waiver was valid only under certain conditions,
one of which was timely commencement of the action. 25 In short, the Court
17
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of Claims had jurisdiction over any claims in which sovereign immunity
was waived, and sovereign immunity was waived only if the claim was
timely filed. For the Federal Circuit, this rendered the statute of limitations
jurisdictional and, for purposes of that case, not subject to waiver by the
parties.
Viewing the limitations period as jurisdictional overlooks two discrete
concerns. The first is the text of § 2501. Properly read, it addresses the time
for bringing claims and not the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. Section
2501 speaks of “every claim of which the United States Court of Federal
Claims has jurisdiction,” but that language is not addressed to the court;
rather, it is addressed to the parties contemplating such cases. Since the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims extends no further than claims for monetary recovery against the United States, the quoted language means “every
claim against the United States”; so understood, § 2501 is more clearly
grounded in a merits determination of who can be sued for some conduct.
Second, on close examination, sovereign immunity makes better sense
as a merits issue. By subjecting the United States to suit, Congress identifies an appropriate and available defendant in an action—itself. The United
States places itself under a legal duty to adhere to substantive rules in its
contracting and business conduct and attaches a judicially enforceable legal
consequence—monetary liability—to its failure to adhere to its duties. Absent the waiver of sovereign immunity, no claim would lie against the
United States because there would be no enforceable duty on the United
States to behave in a particular way and no right to legal remedy from the
United States. This is the essence of merits analysis—who can be sued for
what conduct to recover what remedy. 26
The “immunity” label and its treatment as a threshold litigation issue
do not change that character. For example, government-official immunities
(for example, absolute judicial immunity from constitutional claims) also
are threshold defenses providing protection from suit (not merely liability),
but courts nevertheless treat them as defenses to the merits. 27 Similarly, the
Court of Claims remains open and empowered to hear claims against the
United States; the different question is whether the conditions for waiver of
immunity can be established in a given plaintiff’s case.
The actual jurisdictional grant for the Court of Claims in § 1491(a)(1)
identifies the appropriate forum for any lawsuit against the United States for
the claims identified. That provision functions as a party-based jurisdictional grant, under which federal judicial power over an action turns on the

26
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a prerequisite for jurisdiction.”).
27
See, e.g., Rogers v. Montgomery, No. 4:07-1512-MBS, 2007 WL2152896, at *3 (D.S.C. July 25,
2007).
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identity of the parties. 28 Compare this with basic diversity jurisdiction, under which federal district courts attain jurisdiction based on the citizenship
of the parties. 29 The diversity statute disconnects jurisdiction and the substantive merits of the underlying claim. 30 Where the named defendant in a
diversity action is not the proper or appropriate party because the conditions
for its liability under substantive law have not been met, the plaintiff’s case
is lost on the merits, not for want of diversity jurisdiction. Section
1491(a)(1) should be understood in the same way. When the United States
is not a proper defendant because the conditions for it to be sued and subject to liability on a contract or other monetary claim—such as the timeliness of the lawsuit—have not been met, the case against the United States is
lost on the merits. The Court of Claims never loses its adjudicative jurisdiction—it simply has no valid claim to adjudicate against a potentially liable defendant.
The Supreme Court ultimately affirmed in John R. Sand, holding that
the lower court was required to raise the limitations issue sua sponte and
there was no waiver of the issue. Importantly, however, the Court seemed to
purposefully avoid expanding the concept of jurisdiction. The Court never
described the limitations period as jurisdictional, instead labeling it a “more
absolute[] kind of limitations period.” 31 In other words, § 2501 retains
unique rigid characteristics akin to jurisdictional rules, but is not necessarily
an actual jurisdictional rule because it is not tied to the court’s raw structural authority to hear and resolve legal and factual issues in the case. The
Court essentially disaggregated one prime consequence of jurisdictionality—non-waivability—from the jurisdictional label and read § 2501 as attaching those consequences to a non-jurisdictional, thus merits-related,
limitations period. 32 Merits-based affirmative defenses ordinarily are subject to party waiver, but that need not be so. As the master of the scope and
nature of the rights existing as federal substantive law, Congress could create a uniquely absolute, mandatory statute of limitations that nevertheless
remains substantive-merits-based. It need only make clear the mandatory
nature of the particular limitations defense.
Evan Tsen Lee argues that there is no hard conceptual difference between jurisdiction and merits, and that nothing categorically separates jurisdiction questions from merits questions other than legislative say-so. Thus,

28

Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV.
1499, 1508 (1990); Edward Hartnett, The Standing of the United States: How Criminal Prosecutions
Show that Standing Doctrine is Looking for Answers in All the Wrong Places, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2239,
2250 n.57 (1999).
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28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000) (link).
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Lee, supra note 6, at 1626; Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 701.
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John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. U.S, No. 06-1164, slip op. at 3 (U.S. Jan. 8, 2008).
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nothing prevents the legislature from tying jurisdiction to the equities. 33
But, simply because Congress can define jurisdiction in merits terms does
not mean it should. Any overlap is “awkward for legal doctrine and the legal culture” and unnecessarily complicates procedural matters. 34
Whether or not it is possible to create a single framework for defining
jurisdiction, 35 it is possible to eliminate unnecessary overlap by consciously
avoiding it in the legislative and judicial lawmaking processes. As a practical matter, there is no reason for Congress to define jurisdiction by anything
related to the merits or equities of a case; nothing is gained by linking them
and a great deal is lost. Nor is there reason for the courts to affirmatively
interpret Congress as having linked them. Mindful legislative drafting and
similarly mindful judicial analysis should achieve the necessary clean and
clear line between this pair. John R. Sand now gives Congress a new drafting option. It can make some merits rules “more absolute” without squeezing those rules into the jurisdictional box. This provides the systemic
benefits of non-waivable requirements without muddying or overexpanding the concept of jurisdiction and without forcing courts to adopt
strained statutory readings.
II. JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
Dodson’s recent work analyzes two timing provisions: the time for removing cases to federal court and the time for filing a notice of appeal from
the district court to the court of appeals. 36 Timing rules straddle the jurisdiction/procedure line. While jurisdictional rules define whether a court
can exercise power to hear and resolve a case, procedural rules dictate how
a court will do so. 37 Timing rules might fit logically in either category.
Dodson divides the concepts around three key normative concerns.
The first is whether Congress has specifically designated a rule as jurisdictional, with a presumption of jurisdictionality applied when Congress
speaks in jurisdictional terms about the class of cases a court can hear. 38
The second looks to the function of a provision and whether it determines
the power of the courts or whether it controls the behavior of the parties in
litigation. 39 This considers to whom a rule is directed: jurisdictional rules
are directed at the court and its power, while procedural rules are directed to
33

Lee, supra note 6, at 1614, 1627, 1629.
Dane, supra note 6, at 47; Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 662.
35
Compare Dodson, supra note 1, at 66 with Lee, supra note 6, at 1629.
36
Dodson, supra note 1, at 56, 58; Scott Dodson, Jurisdictionality and Bowles v. Russell, 102 NW.
U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 42, 48 (2007), http://colloquy.law.northwestern.edu/main/2007/08/
jurisdictionali.html (link) [hereinafter Dodson, Jurisdictionality].
37
Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2364 (2007) (link); Dodson, supra note 1, at 59–60, 71;
Dodson, Jurisdictionality, supra note 36, at 44.
38
Dodson, supra note 1, at 66; Dodson, Jurisdictionality, supra note 36, at 43.
39
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the parties and their rights and obligations within litigation. 40 Procedural
rules go to the “fairness and efficiency of the truth-finding process,” ultimately serving systemic values such as litigant autonomy, judicial efficiency, and cost-effectiveness. 41 The third concern looks to the effects and
implications of characterizing a rule as one or the other. 42 Dodson’s framework is sound and consistent with my suggestions for the jurisdiction/merits
pairing, particularly in its focus on the language of the applicable legal rule
and whether it speaks to the court about its structural power or to the parties
about how to behave within the litigation process.
Unfortunately, the Court last term in Bowles v. Russell ignored
Dodson’s framework—as well as any other meaningful framework. Instead, it simply declared that the time requirement for filing a notice of appeal was jurisdictional and thus not subject to any exception, even when the
reason for the untimely filing was a party’s reliance on a judicial order that
incorrectly stated the time for filing the appeal. 43 The Court’s only explanation was that the timing requirement appeared in a statute that was enacted
by both houses of Congress and signed by the President, rather than in a
court-promulgated rule. 44 Dodson accurately criticizes Bowles in this space,
taking the majority to task for failing to adopt any coherent guidelines beyond the distinction between statutory or rule sources. 45 This is a meaningless justification because there is nothing inherently jurisdictional about a
statute, particularly one that that neither speaks to the court nor mentions jurisdiction.
Dodson is correct that the demarcation between jurisdiction and procedure may be less urgent than between jurisdiction and merits, because the
timing and manner of adjudicating issues does not diverge with this pair as
it does with jurisdiction and merits. Jurisdiction is one of several procedural preliminaries that courts consider mainly at the outset of litigation,
with the court acting as finder of fact for all of them. 46 The only difference
between them lies in the unique elements of jurisdiction—non-waivability
and the independent judicial obligation to investigate. 47 Jurisdictional rules
also are generally understood to admit no equitable leniency or flexibility,
an understanding Professor Dane labels an unfortunate mistake. 48

40

Id.
John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 725 (1974); Dodson, supra
note 1, at 71; Dodson, Jurisdictionality, supra note 36, at 46.
42
Dodson, supra note 1, at 77.
43
Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2365 (2007).
44
Id. at 2364–66; see 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) (2000) (link); FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(6).
45
Dodson, Jurisdictionality, supra note 36, at 45.
46
See Dodson, supra note 1, at 69–70; Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 649–50.
47
Dodson, supra note 1, at 60.
48
Dane, supra note 8, at 167–68.
41
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But, just as the John R. Sand Court read a merits rule to possess jurisdictional characteristics, 49 Congress similarly could define a procedural rule
to possess some or all jurisdictional characteristics and consequences.
Dodson argues that the outcome in Bowles—that the time for filing an appeal is not subject to equitable exception and thus that appeal was untimely—was correct. 50 The timing rule could be understood as “mandatory
but nonjurisdictional”; the rule governs the parties’ conduct in court and
does not go to the basic structural values that define jurisdiction, but the
court possesses no discretion to deviate from the rule on equitable
grounds. 51 As the Court did in John R. Sand, Dodson disaggregates the
consequences of jurisdiction from the core definition of the term. This produces the expected benefits of the rigidity that accompanies jurisdictionality, when intended by the rule maker, “without doing violence to the nature
of jurisdiction.” 52 In fact, the discussion of Bowles in John R. Sand suggests the Court has retroactively recast the earlier decision to make the appeals-timing rule absolute for purposes of efficiency, but not necessarily
jurisdictional. 53
Note that the middle road proposed by Dodson and implicitly approved
of in John R. Sand may serve to further cloud the line between jurisdiction
and procedure. If Congress can assign a jurisdictional characteristic to a
procedural rule, any practical distinctions between jurisdictional rules and
procedural rules seems lost. Nothing else defines the practical divide between these two strands, since the court serves as fact-finder for both issues.
Characterizing a rule in this pair as one or the other thus must focus on the
policies and values underlying the rule—structural values that define jurisdictional rules as opposed to litigant- and efficiency-based values that define procedural rules. 54 It also forces courts to find the formalist core of
what it means for a rule to be “jurisdictional,” something the courts heretofore have been reluctant to attempt. 55
Procedure and jurisdiction do align and divide over the question of
congressional power over each. On one hand, the extent of congressional
control over federal-court jurisdiction has been an ongoing topic of textual,
theoretical, and policy debate and dispute, 56 with a number of commentators
arguing that the text of Article III limits Congress’ ability to cut into the ju49

Supra notes 31–32.
Dodson, Jurisdictionality, supra note 36, at 46.
51
Id. at 46–47; but see Dane, supra note 8, at 164 (“[T]ime limits can also be jurisdictional without
being interpreted literally and peremptorily . . . .”).
52
Dodson, Jurisdictionality, supra note 36, at 46.
53
Posting
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Dodson
on
Civil
Procedure
Prof.
Blog,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro/2008/01/dodson-three-mu.html (Jan. 8, 2008) (link).
54
Dodson, Jurisdictionality, supra note 36, at 46–47.
55
Dane, supra note 8, at 175 (criticizing courts’ failure to “draw connections and to investigate the
roots of legal ideas”); Dane, Jurisdictionality, supra note 6, at 135.
56
Wasserman, Non-Extant Rights, supra note 4, at 227–29, 269–71.
50
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risdiction of the federal judiciary. 57 On the other hand, there generally has
been far less debate over congressional power over judicial procedure;
courts and commentators long have accepted that Congress can dictate federal procedure through prospective rules, whether by delegating that power
to the judiciary, as under the Rules Enabling Act, or by making procedural
rules itself. 58 Thus, faced with a congressionally enacted rule that somehow
limits judicial power, its definition as jurisdictional or procedural may be
essential to understanding the validity of the particular rule.
III. PROCEDURE AND MERITS
This pair has the longest history together. The distinction between
procedure and substance is famously at the federalist heart of the modern
Erie-Hanna Doctrine, dictating the choice between federal and state law in
diversity cases in federal court. 59 Procedure focuses on rules going to the
fairness and efficiency of the truth-finding process and substance goes to
everything else. 60 Courts apply a functional approach, looking to whether
the policy underlying the rule “pertains to the operation of the federal
courts” and is integrated into a system generally applicable to all civil actions and designed to achieve just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution. 61
The split is tenuous, given that procedural rules necessarily affect substantive results. 62 But overlapping effects are not a problem; after all, the
goal of modern federal procedure is to enable resolution of cases on their
merits. 63 The point is defining and understanding the two concepts, and
here the Court arguably has drawn a “serviceable line between state ‘substantive’ law that binds federal courts and ‘procedural’ law governed by
federal rules.” 64
57

Amar, supra note 28, at 1507–08; James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority,
and the Constitutionality of Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 237–38 (2007)
(link).
58
See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471–72 (1965) (link); Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1677, 1681–82 (2004) [hereinafter
Burbank, Procedure]; Burbank, Rules Enabling Act, supra note 24, at 1115–16. But see Linda S.
Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77 MINN. L. REV. 375, 382 (1992).
59
Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996) (link); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr.,
Not Bad for Government Work: Does Anyone Else Think the Supreme Court is Doing a Halfway Decent
Job in its Erie-Hanna Jurisprudence?, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 963, 966 (1998).
60
Ely, supra note 41, at 725.
61
Paul D. Carrington, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J.
281, 308.
62
Burbank, Procedure, supra note 58, at 1710; Martin H. Redish & Christopher R. Pudelski, Legislative Deception, Separation of Powers, and the Democratic Process: Harnessing the Political Theory
of United States v. Klein, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 437, 460 (2006) (link).
63
FED. R. CIV. P. 1; Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 439 (1986).
64
Craig Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth, 95 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 21),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1009992 (link).
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The procedure/merits line also rides on strong separation-of-powers
concerns, dividing the respective lawmaking capacities of Congress and the
courts. The Rules Enabling Act delegates to the Supreme Court, and in turn
to a standing advisory committee, power to make general rules of procedure. 65 It further prohibits the Court from making any rules that “abridge[],
enlarge[] or modif[y] any substantive right.” 66 Stephen Burbank grounds
the latter limitation on allocation of federal rulemaking powers between
Congress and the Court, with Congress delegating only control over procedural rules, while retaining power to make substantive rules. 67 Congress reserves to itself the power to make rules governing real-world, primary
conduct and defining rights, duties, and obligations beyond the four walls of
the courthouse, while the Supreme Court under the REA is limited only to
making rules governing conduct within the four walls of the courthouse. 68
One example of the legislative/judicial divide and the problem of separation of powers is the extent to which Congress can limit judicial enforcement and remediation of federal constitutional rights. Central to that debate
is whether remedies properly are viewed as substantive, and thus tied to the
merits, or as procedural. No one doubts congressional power to define
remedies where it creates the underlying substantive right. 69 And the consensus is that Congress retains power to establish procedural rules through
its ordinary legislative powers. 70 But Congress cannot define the meaning
of an underlying substantive constitutional right. 71 Thus, the propriety of
legislative limitations on judicial constitutional remedies depends on how
we characterize remedies.
On one end, John Harrison espouses the traditional view of remedies as
procedural, subject to fairly plenary control through Congress’ structural
legislative powers. 72 Harrison argues that Congress takes the substantive
legal rules, such as the meaning of constitutional provisions and rights, as
given, then wields its structural authority to choose the means to implement
and enforce those rights. 73 Daryl Levinson labels this traditional view
“rights essentialism.” The constitutional right exists as the ideal, as an ultimate value judgment about what the Constitution means and what it protects; remedies—the rules for implementing constitutional rights and
protecting against their future violation—exist in the realm of the concrete.
The sharp distinction between rights and remedies produces a “division of
65

28 U.S.C. §§ 2072(a), 2073 (2000) (link).
28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (link).
67
Burbank, Rules Enabling Act, supra note 24, at 1113.
68
Id. at 1113–14.
69
Tracy A. Thomas, Congress’ Section 5 Power and Remedial Rights, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 673,
696 (2001) (link).
70
Supra note 56–58.
71
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (link).
72
Harrison, supra note 7, at 2514.
73
Id. at 2514–15.
66

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/6/

224

102:215 (2008)

Jurisdiction, Merits, and Procedure

institutional labor between courts and Congress,” under which courts are
uniquely well-qualified to deal with idealized and abstract constitutional
judgments about principles and values. At the same time, however, courts
should defer to Congress’ close legislative control over the process of applying those constitutional values and principles to the real world by defining expansive or narrow remedies. 74
On the other end is Tracy Thomas’s theory of the unified right, under
which the remedy is “the intrinsic, operative component activating the descriptive component of all unified substantive rights.” 75 A unified right has
both a descriptive component that sets forth a legal guarantee, duty, or
moral assertion grounded in the Constitution, and a remedial component
that imposes an active requirement as a consequence of a violation of the
descriptive duty. Rights and remedies are inseparable, the former meaningless without the latter. The remedial power is derivative of the substantive
power over the definitional right; the institutional actor that defines the core
right has the power to dictate remedies for that right. 76 Because Congress
does not and cannot define the meaning of the descriptive constitutional
right, it does not have the power to dictate corresponding constitutional
remedies. 77 Only the courts possess this power, as an aspect of defining the
descriptive constitutional right.
The procedure/merits corner also reveals that the long-standing academic obsession with “jurisdiction stripping” misses the larger point. Remedial limitations, understood as procedural rules distinct from and
collateral to substantive rights, arguably pose a greater threat to the ability
of federal courts to vindicate substantive rights, than straight-forward strips
of subject-matter jurisdiction. 78
But questions remain as to the degree to which Congress might engage
in “procedure stripping”—using procedural rules and schemes to limit the
most vigorous judicial enforcement of substantive rights. For example,
Congress often creates and entwines merits and procedure in a single statutory scheme. Consider the prohibitions on employment discrimination in
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Congress established real-world
rights to be free from adverse employment action based on certain impermissible motivations (such as an employee’s race or sex) and imposed on
employers a duty to refrain from discriminatory activities against employees. Congress also tied these rights to a specific and detailed remedial procedural scheme requiring: prompt initial submission, in a narrow time
74
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frame, of claims to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for
conciliation and non-adversarial resolution; exhaustion of non-litigation efforts; and prompt internal reporting of claims prior to any official complaint
and efforts at internal employer dispute resolution. 79
The result, according to Deborah Brake and Joanna Grossman, is that
Title VII often does not function as a meaningful “right-claiming scheme,”
because compliance with the extensive right-specific procedural requirements effectively makes it difficult or impossible for plaintiffs to vindicate
those rights. 80 Scott Moss implicates the Court in this problem, arguing that
it has acted to further two irreconcilable procedural policies—first, that
plaintiffs should wait to initiate litigation in favor of internal, informal, nonadversary, administrative resolution, and second, that plaintiffs should file
immediately—to render Title VII incoherent and impossible to navigate. 81
It is the relatively rare plaintiff who can steer and clear these conflicting
hurdles to gain meaningful access to the promised substantive rights. The
result is that the substantive protections purported to derive from the statute
remain largely elusive and illusory.
Martin Redish derives one potential limit on congressional procedure
stripping from constitutional democratic theory. In the name of democratic
accountability, he argues, a legislature cannot deceive the public as to the
state of their substantive primary rights, liberties, and duties by manipulating the attendant procedures. 82 Accountability concerns prevent Congress
from defining a general rule of real-world behavior—which the public believes entitles it to engage in some conduct or to be free from some conduct
by others (such as discrimination in employment because of race or sex)—
while simultaneously imposing procedural hurdles that prevent courts from
appropriately applying that rule, effectively transforming the nature of the
substantive right. 83 To do so is to engage in a “political shell game,”
achieving substantive policy outcomes by hiding the true state of that policy
from the public. 84 This, in turn, undermines the public’s ability to judge
representatives’ performance by their votes on normative social policy
choices. 85
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If Grossman and Brake are correct that Title VII has failed as a source
of substantive rights because those rights have been overwhelmed by its
procedural scheme, perhaps Title VII becomes an example of the very political shell game that Redish condemns. Certainly Redish’s argument suggests some undefined limits on Congress’ ability to bury substantive rights
within non-navigable procedural layers—at least without making it clear
that it is doing so and that it intends to do so.
CONCLUSION
Scott Dodson invited a conversation about the trichotomy of merits, jurisdiction, and procedure, and I hope this Essay serves as a workable opening statement. Whether we can formally disentangle the three concepts or
each of the three pairs perhaps is a matter of dispute. But by thinking in
terms of the overlap and the interactions among them, perhaps we can remember how important it is to keep them separate from one another in the
course of creating and applying legal rules. And perhaps in time we might
find a middle ground among the strands, in which they might share characteristics and consequences while retaining distinct conceptual identities and
definitions.
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